About me
Hi! I am Dongjin Hwang (황동진), a Master’s student in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University (SNU). I received my B.A. in Economics and B.S. in Mathematics from Seoul National University in 2024.
My primary research interests lie in microeconomic theory and political economy, but more broadly, I am drawn to economic theory as a whole.
You can access my CV here
Feel free to reach out any time to: djsteve@snu.ac.kr
Working Papers
Competitive Information Disclosure with Heterogeneous Consumer Search (with Ilwoo Hwang).
Draft date: July, 2025 (Updated). Submitted. Slides (90min).
Extended Abstract in EC’25
Talks: SNU Micro Lunch (2024), UIUC Micro Lunch (2024), ACM EC’25 (2025), Stony Brook ICGT (2025), ESWC (2025), Asian School in Economic Theory (2025, accepted), University of Tokyo (2025, by coauthor)
Abstract
We study a model of competitive information design in an oligopoly search market with heterogeneous consumer search costs. A unique class of equilibria—upper-censorship equilibria—emerges under intense competition. In equilibrium, firms balance competitive pressure with local monopoly power granted by search frictions. Notably, firms disclose only partial information even as the number of firms approaches infinity. The maximal informativeness of equilibrium decreases under first-order shifts in the search cost distribution, but varies non-monotonically under mean-preserving spreads. The model converges to the full-disclosure benchmark as search frictions vanish, and to the no-disclosure benchmark as search costs become homogeneous. Moreover, we show that the well-known discontinuities of equilibrium with respect to the search cost distribution in price search literature carry over to information competition.
Work in Progress
Split the Calendar to Split the Power: Mismatched Electoral Cycles as a Disciplining Device. (Draft available upon request)
Abstract
In many presidential democracies, the executive and legislative branches often operate on mismatched electoral cycles, due to differing term lengths, election timing, or both. This paper asks: When and why might voters prefer such mismatched calenders over synchronized ones? The central finding is that mismatch can enhance accountability when the power between branches is uneven. I develop a dynamic agency model where two branches jointly bargain over a public budget between rents and public goods. I compare two institutional settings that reflect different degree of de facto separation of powers. Mismatch enhances voter welfare when the bargaining power is asymmetric: frequent turnover in the weaker branch forces repeated negotiation, making collusion harder to sustain. In contrast, when bargaining power is symmetrically divided, mismatch has little effect, as institutional separation alone disciplines behavior. These results suggest that electoral mismatch can act as a substitute for formal checks and a safeguard against political capture. This is the first to study how such mismatch affects political accountability of both branches.
Mismatched Electoral Cycles and Corruption: A Cross-Country Evidence
Information Transmission in Social Networks: Motivations and Partisanship (with Hanil Chang, Syngjoo Choi, Abhisheka Dubey, Yong Kyun Kim, Yoonje Lee)